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THE BIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Alan Watson* 
THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS: STUDIES IN CICERO'S PRO 
CAECINA. By Bruce W. Frier. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
1985. Pp. xxiv, 317. $36. 
This is a properly scholarly book, written by Bruce W. Frier, one 
of the best American historians writing on Roman law. I stress this 
because this review will be largely critical: I find the book unconvinc-
ing in its conclusions. Also, the author attempts to tell more than one 
story in the book, an approach that seems misguided. Frier begins his 
preface: 
I have two stories to tell. The first is the story of a lawsuit brought more 
than two millennia ago, and of the remarkable speech delivered during 
it; the second is the story of how, in the decades preceding and following 
this lawsuit, the legal profession originated and first rose to influence. 
My conviction, upon which this book is based, is that these two stories 
are interlinked, though not in a direct causal way; they are interlinked 
because neither story is completely comprehensible without the other. 
[p. xi] 
In telling these stories the author weaves in a great deal of Roman 
background. We are told, for instance, of the physical appearance of 
the court and of how the participants in a lawsuit dressed and con-
ducted themselves (pp. 57-63); and also of modern sociological theory, 
on subjects such as legitimation through judicial procedure (pp. 236-
52). 
My uneasiness begins with this opening paragraph and with the 
title of the book. The main cause of uneasiness is not that telling two 
stories makes the narrative very complicated, as it does; nor that Frier 
never demonstrates that he is justified in drawing general conclusions 
about the rise of the Roman jurists from the individual lawsuit involv-
ing Cicero's famous speech, pro Caecina. Nor is it that, despite the 
title of the book, arguments detailing the causes of the rise of the Ro-
man jurists are rather sparse, and almost give the impression that this 
theme is included as an afterthought (even though Chapter Seven, 
Conclusion: The Professionalization of Law, is devoted to it). The 
cause of my uneasiness is that, with this focus on one lawsuit, Frier 
does not take the long historical view of the rise of the jurists. The 
scene for their rise in fact was set long before the middle of the second 
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century B.C., and their rise is incomprehensible unless earlier circum-
stances are fully taken into account. Frier's approach causes him to 
fail to address the fundamental question in the rise of the jurists: Why 
ever did the Roman state allow (or even encourage) private individu-
als, whose separation as jurists from politics Frier stresses, to have 
such importance in the making of law? Frier's two stories would have 
been better kept apart. 
In the review that follows I will discuss only his treatment of the 
rise of the jurists (which ought to be the more important subject). 
Frier's approach causes him to exaggerate fatally (a) the extent to 
which Quintus Mucius Scaevola (consul in 95 B.C.) marked a new 
beginning; (b) the separation of the Praetor (and his Edict) from the 
authority of the jurists; (c) the uncertainty of the law and the signifi-
cance of this; and ( d) the extent to which the jurists had a common 
strategy. 
Frier writes in his preface: 
We know that in the late Republic, more or less during Cicero's lifetime, 
Roman legal science made important advances. During the second and 
early first century B.C., the stability of the Roman judicial system had 
been shaken by two important events: the introduction of important pro-
cedural reforms, mainly through the Praetor's Edict, and the emergence 
of rhetorical advocacy in pleadings. Both events tended to increase legal 
insecurity. The jurisconsults, Rome's unofficial legal experts, at first re-
acted slowly and rather tentatively to these challenges. At last, however, 
in the early first century B.C. a small group of jurisconsults (Q. Mucius 
Scaevola and his students) sought to counter disintegrative influences on 
law by reconstructing their ancient craft as a more autonomous and in-
tellectual discipline. Their aim was evidently to secure for themselves 
and for law a more commanding presence within the Roman judicial 
system and Roman society generally. In essence, they ceased to be juris-
consults only, and became jurists as well, with major consequences for 
subsequent Western law. Through these men the legal profession walked 
for the first time onto the stage of history; the late Republican jurists 
were clearly "professionals" in that they possessed and exploited specific 
knowledge and skills which were inaccessible to laymen, and in that they 
also had at least rudimentary forms of regularized intercommunication, 
work autonomy, specialist literature, colleague "control," organized ed-
ucation, and even ethics. [p. xiii] 
It is on this paragraph and on Frier's remarks connected with it that I 
wish to center my review. 
I agree, of course, that the period saw "important procedural re-
forms, mainly through the Praetor's Edict." But I would not accept 
that the "stability of the judicial system had been shaken" thereby. 
Rather, the reforms increased the stability of the system by moderniz-
ing it and making it more suitable for a society on the move. Frier 
does not explain how the stability of the system was shaken. 
These procedural reforms, I think Frier would hold, were of two 
April-May 1987] Roman Jurists 1073 
kinds. One was the replacement through the Praetor of the archaic 
formal procedure known as legis actiones by the flexible formulae, 
which Frier partially attributes (and many would agree) to the lex 
Aebutia (p. 157). The other procedural reform comprised the intro-
duction of new actions. These might be entirely original, such as those 
for the contracts of sale and hire, which were set out with their formu-
lae in the Edict - whether or not the Praetor also issued an edict1 
stating that he would grant an action on a sale or hire. Or they might 
be actions, such as several controlling succession, that in effect blocked 
the old civil law rules which may have been set out in the XII Tables. 
By controlling legal proceedings, the Praetor in effect changed the 
law. But if it was a legislative body (which passed the lex Aebutia) and 
the Praetor who were responsible for these procedural reforms that 
had a profound effect on the substance and modernity of the law, then 
- and this is the first point I wish to take up from Frier's paragraph 
- how can it be, as Frier claims, the jurists who got rid of archaic 
law? Frier says of the jurists: "Their achievement lay in the liberation 
of Roman private law from its stultifying archaic formalism, in the 
ascendancy of the quasi-ethical principle bona fides, and in the crea-
tion of a juristic method for managing legal materials" (p. 193). Yet I 
cannot think of one example where a jurist qua jurist freed private law 
from archaism: the abolition of the fundamental archaism - from 
legis actio to formula - was the work of legislator and Praetor. New 
remedies were again the creation of the Praetor.2 Frier in this context 
also says: "Yet we are told that in conversation Q. Mucius was wont 
to stress the fundamental importance for Roman law of the concept 
bonafides and the actions ex.fide bona (Cic. Off. 3.70)" (p. 159). Yet 
where exactly do we find the setting of the words ex fide bona? The 
answer is precisely in the Praetor's Edict, in the formulae for actions 
such as those on sale (emptio venditio) or guardianship (tutela). Inso-
far as the jurists are to be given credit for the development of concepts 
such as bona fides it is because the Praetor, responsible for the notion 
in his Edict, left its working-out in detail to the jurists. The relation-
ship between Praetor's Edict and the development of the law by the 
jurists is close. 
But Frier seems to keep the Praetor and the jurists at arm's length. 
Thus, he attributes the introduction of the actio de dolo - not, as he 
habitually calls it, actio doli - to Aquillius Gallus as jurist, not as 
Praetor (pp. 148, 262). His argument for this is that the dramatic date 
- not the date of writing - of Cicero's De Natura Deorum (in which 
the action is mentioned) is 76 B.C. and Gallus became Praetor only in 
1. The term "Edict" with a capital letter is used to designate the whole praetorian apparatus 
setting out formulae and clauses promising a remedy, whereas "edict" is used to denote an indi-
vidual clause of the Edict. 
2. Frier shows himself to be not unaware of this. See p. 193. 
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66 B.C. But this is a weak argument compared with that in favor of 
Gallus as Praetor, an argument that Frier does not discuss. In the De 
Officiis 3.60, Cicero writes: "Nondum enim C. Aquillius, collega et 
familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas" (For my colleague 
and friend C. Aquillius, had not yet brought forth his formulae on 
fraud). But the verb proferre (used also in De Natura Deorum 3. 74) is 
more appropriate for official promulgation than unofficial recommen-
dation. And it is precisely as Praetors in the year 66 B.C. that Cicero 
and Aquillius Gallus were colleagues! Frier also says: "Other late Re-
publican innovations bear the names of jurists: the actio Serviana, 
governing security for debt and named probably for Servius; the 
iudicium Cascellianum, against contumacious defendants of posses-
sory interdicts, named for A. Cascellius" (p. 262). But if the actio 
Serviana is named for Servius this might be because, as J.M. Kelly 
argues, he was responsible for it as Praetor, which he was in 65 B.C.3 
Other remedies certainly do bear names which could be those of 
Praetors not known as jurists: interdictum Salvianum (a Salvius was 
praetor urbanus around 74 B.C.); actio Publiciana (Q. Publicius was 
Praetor around 67 B.C.); actio Calvisiana (a Calvisius was Praetor in 
46 B.C.).4 
The reason for this distancing of jurist and Praetor lies, I believe, 
in Frier's belief that the rise of the jurists in part results from their 
response to the increase in legal insecurity caused by the growth of the 
Edict. He makes much of this supposed legal insecurity resulting from 
the Edict. This brings me to the second point I wish to take up from 
the paragraph quoted from Frier's preface. Frier stresses that the ju-
rists of the last century of the Republic were no longer senators but 
were from the lower ranks of equites, a fact that he believes needs 
explanation (pp. 256-60). The equites, many of whom were involved 
in banking, trade, or public contracting, would be interested in calcu-
lating the legal consequences of their acts, and would be keen on legal 
security (pp. 257-58). But Frier himself implicitly admits that one 
cannot prove that the equites actively sought legal security (p. 258). 
Nor can one show - I don't think Frier even tries to show - that the 
jurists sought to give legal security. One can show that the jurists in-
terpreted the Edict and the civil law; one cannot show that the jurists 
thereby sought to give greater legal security, since in fact it is a 
marked characteristic of the jurists that they frequently disagreed in 
their opinions. Different interpretations may increase legal insecurity. 
And in the absence of a juristic attempt to secure unanimity, one can-
not without evidence claim a policy of the jurists to promote security. 
Nor is it really clear that the growth of the Edict would contribute 
3. Kelly, The Growth-Pattern of the Praetor's Edict, 1 IRISH JURIST 341, 347 (1966). 
4. See A. WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 32 (1974). The identi-
fications are not secure. 
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to legal insecurity, though it certainly would contribute to legal devel-
opment, including the making of law favorable to commerce. Cer-
tainly it is true that the clauses of the Edict are brief, technical, and, 
on their face, incomprehensible to the layman. But the conclusions 
are not, and cannot be, those drawn by Frier. Take, for example, one 
of the two model formulae for the consensual contract of sale (emptio 
venditio), that which was available to the buyer: 
Whereas AA bought from NN the slave on account of whom the action 
is brought, whatever on that account NN ought to give to or do for AA 
in accordance with good faith, in that amount, judge, condemn NN to 
AA. If it does not appear, absolve him. 
This praetorian innovation as it stands will not tell a lay purchaser 
much: not what the requirements are for a valid contract of sale, not 
what the seller's obligations to him are, not what his own duties are, 
not what damages will be due for any default. But we should not con-
clude therefore that in creating the contract of sale and so developing 
the law the Praetor was deliberately or negligently increasing its inse-
curity, hence giving rise to the need for a new class of jurists who 
would remedy his deficiencies. Rather the implication must be that 
the Praetor could afford to be so brief because those people who might 
get involved with a lawsuit in whatever capacity had some idea of the 
nature of the contract and of their rights and duties under it. As with 
almost all "legislation," details of interpretation are left to be worked 
out later. 
But where does this general knowledge of the law come from? The 
extreme brevity of edictal clauses makes sense only on the assumption 
that such knowledge exists: it does not come from public officials; it 
comes too late in the course of a dispute if it comes from judges (who, 
in any event, are laymen). In Roman circumstances it can only come 
from persons like jurists who, we know, existed, and who wrote and 
gave opinions about law, and whose views were treated with high re-
gard. In other words, it was not insecurity of law caused by the 
growth of the Praetor's Edict - whose clauses were, on their face, 
obscure - that brought about the rise of the jurists. Rather, it was the 
existence of persons learned in the law that enabled the Praetor to 
issue such brief, apparently uninformative, edictal clauses.5 Moreover, 
this development suggests a certain closeness, even cooperation, be-
tween Praetor and jurist. The former had no qualms in allowing the 
law largely to be developed by the latter; the latter was happy with the 
task he voluntarily and gratuitously took upon himself. But what is 
further instructive about the example just chosen from emptio venditio 
is precisely that that contract came into being at least a century before, 
5. But leaving the scope of the formulae to be determined by subsequent juristic opinion does 
make for some ambiguity. See A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGU-
ITY 20-21 (1984). 
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on Frier's approach, the rise of the jurists. It is hard to believe that a 
century later, but not before, a small group of jurisconsults sought to 
counter disintegrative influences resulting from suchformulae. In ad-
dition to what has gone before, I should also say that Frier nowhere 
produces any evidence to support the use of the word "sought": there 
is no evidence of any common purpose among the jurists. 
Frier emphasizes the role of Q. Mucius Scaevola as the founder of 
this movement. For instance, he discusses Q. Mucius' strategy to raise 
the intellectual content and authority of the civil law as expounded by 
the jurists, to defend the civil law from the disintegrative influences of 
the rapidly evolving Praetor's Edict, and to give the jurists a firm base 
to exert and increase their influence on the courts (pp. 168-71). This 
brings me to my third point on the quotation from Frier's preface, 
namely that although one must not downplay Q. Mucius' importance 
as a jurist (and I think I am not in danger of doing so)6 he does not fit 
into Frier's scheme of development. To begin with, as Frier is cer-
tainly aware and indirectly shows (p. 253), Q. Mucius was not an 
eques but a senator, with even two consular ancestors. 7 Hence, inten-
tions ascribed by Frier to jurists because they were equites cannot 
without more ado be attributed to Q. Mucius, the leader of the group! 
But Frier seems not to address the issue. 
Nor can I see anything in Q. Mucius' work on the civil law that 
would justify a claim that with it he was seeking to counter disintegra-
tive influences on law. It seems to be simply a commentary on law, 
the first to set out the civil law generatim; a good commentary at that, 
which served as a model for later works and which certainly raised 
legal writing to a higher level. Frier, surprisingly perhaps, in the body 
of his text nowhere attempts to demonstrate what further aims Q. 
Mucius might have had. To modem eyes Q. Mucius' books have de-
fects, especially omissions, 8 and it is precisely in these that one might 
try to spot his ultimate aims. The work is archaic; matters not pro-
vided with a proper action by the later third century B.C. are omitted. 
But there is in these omissions no sign of any hostility to the Edict; as 
Frier notes, praetorian actions, such as those on sale or partnership, 
that can be attached to older institutions are discussed (p. 160). 
Others are omitted. But so are whole subjects of the civil law that 
were important, such as marriage, divorce, dowry, cura, and slavery. 
My own tentative suggestion for Q. Mucius' omissions would be as 
follows. He cannot have made a conscious decision to omit all sub-
jects that had no proper action by the later third century B.C. Apart 
from the obvious absurdity of any such course of behavior, he would 
6. See A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 143-58. 
7. See especially W. KUNKEL, HERKUNFT UNO SOZIALE STELLUNG DER RtlMJSCHEN JURJS-
TEN 18 (1952). 
8. See, e.g., pp. 159-60; A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 143-58. 
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have lacked historical knowledge to date the emergence of law. 
Rather, he was a traditionalist and was following some older, now un-
known, model whose roots lay in the distant past and which concen-
trated on actions. Certainly it is only in this way that one can explain 
omissions from the much later Sabinus' commentary on the civil law; 
in his tum Sabinus was relying on the model of Q. Mucius.9 Q. 
Mucius' work is not a new beginning; even if it were, it certainly does 
not provide evidence that he was seeking to counter disintegrative in-
fluences on civil law. 
. In emphasizing the "quantum leap in legal science" (p. 163) made 
by Q. Mucius, Frier claims that "Q. Mucius also begins to deploy 
loose canons for interpretation" (p. 162). Now, in the absence of di-
rect information on previous legal interpretation, it would be impossi-
ble to prove that earlier interpretation was always narrow; and Frier 
produces no evidence for his assertion. But in fact it is possible to 
show indirectly that wide interpretation was used before Q. Mucius. 
Thus, mancipatio was originally a formal conveyance of certain kinds 
of important property known as res mancipi. The ceremony conveyed 
the thing at once. Yet even before the XII Tables of the mid-fifth 
century B.C. the unofficial practice had grown up of using the cere-
mony to make a will which would have future effect, even for the dis-
position of things that were not res mancipi and even for the 
appointment of guardians. This practice was given official recognition 
by the XII Tables.10 Likewise, at some early date, though after the 
XII Tables, mancipatio came to be used to permit adoption. 11 And 
further similar examples can be adduced. None of this could have 
occurred unless there was already a very flexible attitude to the use 
made of law, and this must have extended to canons of interpretation. 
The fourth and final point which I wish to take up is the issue of 
"autonomy of law," which is the concern of the second half of the 
quotation from Frier's preface. Frier discusses this issue in various 
places and in various ways. He says, for instance: 
"Autonomous law" is less a systematic doctrine oflaw than a loose bun-
dle of characteristically juxtaposed ideas, which together constitute a 
sort of "ideal type." Among these ideas are 
(1) strong separation of law from politics, and a consequent empha-
sis on the independence of the judicial system from political influence as 
well as on the division between legislative and judicial functions of 
government; 
(2) a conception of law as a self-consistent body of rules that are 
applied in individual cases and that, because of their existence, both limit 
9. See A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 144-45. For tentative acceptance of my explanation of 
omissions from Q. Mucius, see E. RAWSON, INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN THE LA TE ROMAN REPUB-
LIC 208 (1985). 
10. See A. WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES, PERSONS AND PROPERTY 52-70 (1975). 
11. See id. at 42. 
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the discretion of the judicial system and help to prevent it from intruding 
into politics; 
(3) an emphasis on procedural regularity and fairness (formal jus-
tice) as the primary end and competence of a judicial system; and 
(4) a beliefthat "fidelity to law" means primarily obedience to estab-
lished rules of positive law and, likewise, a conviction that changes in 
law (at any rate, major changes) must be channeled through the political 
process. [pp. 188-89; footnote omitted] 
And he regards "autonomous law" as largely the creation of, and the 
result of the work of, the late Republican jurists (pp. 191-92, 258, 259-
60, 281). 
Now the nature of the autonomous law is clear in the works of the 
late Republican jurists. But it is also an integral part of law in West-
ern systems and is always prominent, at least when law is not being 
used in the forefront of political revolution. It existed long before the 
late Roman Republic, although the scarcity of evidence does not ad-
mit of much detail. Whether the notion of autonomy is expressed or 
not or is fully developed in theoretical writings, it exists wherever 
there is recognition that law operates as a separate entity in society, 
with its own standards for correctness, its own methods of reasoning 
toward a solution, and as being authoritative in its own right. In other 
words, a procedure or decision is "right" precisely because it is in har-
mony with approaches to legal thinking, and not because of other soci-
etal concerns. 12 But then the autonomy of law in Frier's terms is 
already very obvious in the ancient dodges and devices to give further 
scope to an institution such as mancipatio. Originally, as I have said, a 
formal conveyance, mancipatio was used even before the XII Tables to 
make a will and to give a husband power (manus) over his wife in the 
ceremony of coemptio; and at some early date to create servitudes over 
land, as a form of real security in jiducia, to adopt a son by adoptio, 
and to release a son from paternal power by emancipatio. The validity 
of such devices13 is accepted in practice because they correspond to 
recognized standards of legal reasoning, 14 their acceptance is by the 
judicial system, they are independent of direct political influence, 15 
and they are treated as valid not just in one instance but generally. 
Frier's main point is, of course, that the autonomy of law is a par-
ticularly marked feature of late Republican law (and was actively 
sought by the jurists). It was indeed a particularly marked feature of 
late Republican law, but one need see in that no more than a reflection 
of the fa~t that by that time law had come to be highly developed. 
12. See, e.g., A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 67-74 (1985). 
13. On dodges and devices, see especially Daube, Fraud No. 3, in THE LEGAL MIND I (N. 
MacConnick & P. Birks eds. 1986). 
14. If the results simply corresponded to societal notions of rightness, independently of law, 
there would be no need to cloak the devices in the form of a mancipatio. 
15. Political intervention has no need of "devices." 
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Having disagreed so much with Frier, I feel it incumbent on me to 
provide a more plausible alternative and sketch out my own views on 
the role of the jurists in Republican legal development, on their rela-
tionship to the Praetor's Edict, and on why in the last century of the 
Republic the jurists were predominantly equites. 
The fundamental question is why jurists - private individuals -
were allowed to give opinions that were important for creating legal 
rules. Closely allied to that is the second question, why men of status 
found it worthwhile to give legal opinions for no direct financial remu-
neration, and why their prestige - social or political - was enhanced 
by such activity. In the western world this has happened neither before 
nor since. The answers are revealed if we begin at the beginning, long 
before Cicero or his speech pro Caecina. 
Pomponius, a jurist of the second century A.D., tells us that after 
the promulgation of the XII Tables authoritative interpretation of the 
law and of the conduct of actions at law was in the hands of the Col-
lege of Pontiffs.16 This was entirely appropriate. To be effective, law 
must be interpreted. The pontiffs did not belong to a specific caste of 
priests, nor did they devote their whole time to religious observance. 
They were men of substance, successful in public life, and, until 300 
B.C., patricians. They were close to the men who ruled the city and 
were, in addition, an organized group whose talent was recognized. 
They had in fact many of the attributes that Frier associates with a 
"profession" (p. 157). 
Each year, so Pomponius goes on, one of the College of Pontiffs 
was appointed to preside over private citizens. The chosen man would 
then give the opinion of the College on the interpretation of the law, 
and his declaration would be authoritative. Reasonable as this was 
from the point of view of the government, it had an interesting conse-
quence. Patricians, members of the College of Pontiffs and aspirants 
thereto, wished to be learned in the law. Advancement to the College 
would be helped thereby, their prestige among their colleagues in the 
College and other patricians would be increased, and so would their 
reputation among the populace at large. 
Eventually the College of Pontiffs lost its monopoly of interpreta-
tion. As a result, juristic interpretation lost its legitimacy, and legal 
authority its unitary voice.17 But cultural tradition, once established, 
dies hard. A high reputation still resulted from the giving of good 
legal opinions, and men of the highest rank continued to want to in-
crease their prestige through legal expertise. Anyone might, in theory, 
give a legal opinion, but the worth of any opinion was still largely 
16. DIG. 1.2.2.6 (Pomponius, Libra Singulari Enchiridii). Frier refers to this history on p. 
157. 
17. See A. WATSON, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
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determined by the status of the person who gave it; in practice the 
dominant jurisconsults continued to be from society's highest ranks. 
Change came, however, with the development of the Praetor's 
Edict, especially when the Praetor began to issue edicts - not just the 
formulae for new actions - that had the effect of substantially chang-
ing the law. Only around 100 B.C. did it happen that Praetors could 
issue edicts creating totally new actions on substantive law.18 This 
greatly affected the jurisconsults. They were in active cooperation 
with the Praetor. They could suggest new edicts or formulae, and the 
Praetor was generally content to leave the interpretation of the Edict 
to them. But in this cooperation the role of the Praetor dominated. He 
was under no compulsion to follow the jurists' recommendations, and, 
if he did not favor their interpretation of an edictal clause, he could 
change the wording to tilt it to his intent. And the wording of edictal 
clauses often was changed.19 The role of the jurisconsult was only that 
which the Praetor was willing to allot him. This held true even for 
interpretation of the civil law, for if a Praetor did not like what was 
happening there, he was at full liberty to issue an edict amending the 
law. The role of jurisconsult was no longer a suitable one for a senator. 
The way was open for lesser mortals, equites, who gained in prestige 
through their association with the Praetor. These jurists necessarily 
worked harder at law than their predecessors. The value of their legal 
opinions did not come from their social position. Rather, their social 
position came from the worth of their legal expertise. They continued 
to give legal opinions, but they were more likely to be noticed by their 
fellow jurists, Praetors, and prominent citizens if they published 
books, whether collections of responsa or legal commentaries. It was 
every jurist for his own reputation. There is nothing here akin to 
Frier's description: "This is the tacit bargain that Q. Mucius and his 
students offered to the Romans: increased security in private law in 
exchange for the greater prestige of legal experts" (p. 191). 
The rise of the "profession" of jurists in the late Republic was the 
result of the increased importance of law at that time. Frier stresses 
that the impact of jurists' law on the Roman judicial system was 
profound because of external factors, and of these he gives pride of 
place to the dramatic increase in the number of citizens (p. 273). This 
is to tum things upside down. Any impact from the huge increase in 
the citizen body would have been directly on the judicial system and 
the Praetor's Edict, and thus indirectly on the development of jurists' 
law. · 
Of course, it remains a question why Roman law developed then as 
thoroughly as it did. Part of the answer is that this development was 
simply one aspect of the quick expansion of high culture at Rome then 
18. For this argument, see A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 31-62. 
19. See id. at 33-34. 
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and in the succeeding Principate, which is seen also in sculptured por-
trait busts, architecture, and various genres of literature. And for 
many modem scholars the period of true classical law, as of the apex 
of some other aspects of culture, is restricted to the Principate. An-
other part of the answer is simply that no full answer can be given to 
the question why one area of culture rather than another develops at a 
particular time and place. Why, one might ask without the hope of a 
complete answer, the interest in philosophy, of all things, in ancient 
Greece? 
If one insists on knowing why jurists' law was so important in the 
late Republic, then the answer on one level is that, as I have tried to 
show, the machinery for the importance of juristic law was in place 
long before, and the increasing complexity of the society simply 
caused the wheels of this machinery to tum ever faster. On another 
level, the answer lies in the nature of a state's need for legal rules regu-
lating the behavior of individuals among themselves. Such rules are 
needed to inhibit unregulated conflict. But provided the money re-
quired for governmental expenditure is made available and breaches of 
the state's peace are controlled, the central organs of government need 
be little concerned with the content of much of private law. It is this, 
as I hope to show elsewhere,20 that explains much of the evolution of 
English common law. Much of law was under the control of other 
courts before the rise of the king's courts. And much of law could be 
left to the control of these other courts. Kings and their ministers 
have no need to care about what happens before such courts, provided 
the king's peace is kept and the tax money rolls in. Kings and politi-
cians have more fun things to do with their time. Likewise at Rome. 
In Rome, though, there was no need to raise tax money through the 
judicial system. And it can scarcely be overemphasized that the ju-
rists' role was almost entirely confined to private law - therein lies 
the key to their success. So long as the Praetor kept his eye on the 
broad development of the law and on the jurists, and so long as the 
jurists were willing to undertake for free the chore of developing pri-
vate law and making it more systematic, the politicians would have 
been crazy not to let them just get on with it. The content of most 
rules of private law is of little significance for rulers provided there is 
someone to give substance to the rules. 
Though I disagree greatly with the arguments and conclusions I 
have discussed, I find this to be a stimulating book. And I have said 
nothing about the excellent bringing to life of the lawsuit for which 
Cicero wrote his speech on behalf of Caecina. The divergence of our 
conclusions on the rise of the jurists and related matters follows in 
large part from a fundamental difference in the approaches of Bruce 
20. A. WATSON, FAILURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (forthcoming book arising from 
the Julius Rosenthal lectures to be delivered at Northwestern University School of Law in 1987). 
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Frier and myself to an understanding of how law develops in society. 
Frier takes the approach favored by those interested in sociology of 
law. A period of time is selected, and contemporary changes in the 
law and legal system are explained with reference to the conditions 
then prevailing. To me, this approach is excessively limited and dis-
torts the vision. Of course, contemporary conditions affect legal devel-
opment, and sociological study has its role to play in understanding 
legal change. But law has its own traditions in which it is deeply 
rooted, and to a profound extent its development is dictated by the 
culture of the legal elite. 21 The role of the late Republican jurists can-
not be explained so much by the context of the commercial interests of 
some of the class of equites to which they belonged as by the role given 
to the College of Pontiffs centuries before. 
But a subsidiary part of my disagreement with Frier comes from 
the fact that he is not rigorous enough in his use of the sociological 
approach. It is instructive to list the weaknesses in his deductive 
chain: 
(1) Frier assumes but does not attempt to show that the equites, 
some of whom had commercial interests, would actively seek legal cer-
tainty. Indeed, he admits in effect that he cannot demonstrate this. 
(2) Frier assumes but does not attempt to show that jurists who 
were equites would work in the interest of those equites who were in-
volved with commerce. 
(3) Frier asserts but never produces any evidence that the jurists 
who were equites were interested in legal certainty. 
(4) Frier asserts but never produces any evidence that the jurists 
who were equites had some common goal and strategy. 
(5) Frier never attempts to show why, if his theory is valid and the 
rise of the jurists is to be explained by their status as equites seeking to 
further the commercial interests of other equites, the prime mover in 
this rise was Quintus Mucius Scaevola who was no eques but a promi-
nent member of the senatorial order. 
Failure to establish any one of these five propositions - and Frier 
fails to establish every one of the five - entails a failure to establish 
Frier's thesis of the rise of the jurists. 
21. See Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 
(1983). 
